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Some comments on the needs for updated decision support instruments 
Existing decision support systems and the host of underlying data have focused
almost exclusively on accident scenarios at nuclear installations 
The world of today is facing a series of ’new’ threats, notably radiological terrorism,
for which we are not adequately prepared, and which can have special measurement
and analysis requirements. 
A recent report from the US Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism considers it very likely that a large attack using
weapons of mass destruction (could be a nuclear bomb) will occur in a city 
somewhere in the world within the next 4 years. 
Due to the significantly lesser difficulties in acquiring the components and knowledge
needed to construct a potent radiological dispersion device (e.g., a ’dirty bomb’), a 
well-staged radiological terror attack might well be more likely to occur. 
Possible sources
Example of ’orphaned’
sources:
Two containers, each
with 1300 TBq 90Sr,
found in a forest in
Georgia in 2002.
For comparison, the total 90Sr release from Chernobyl was estimated 
to ca. 8000 TBq (Sohier, 2002).
Key factors: availability, sufficient source strength, transportability, 
physical half-life, types of radiation/energies, suitability for 
aerosolisation and dispersion 
Some important radionuclides of concern in connection with ‘dirty bombs’
Radionuclide Typical physicochemical form 
of large existing sources 
Existing strong sources and their 
strengths
60Co Metal (can be dissolved in acid 
- liquid)
Sterilisation irradiator (up to 400,000 
TBq).  Teletherapy source (up to 1000 
TBq)
90Sr Ceramic (SrTiO3) - insoluble, 
brittle, soft (Mohs hardness: 
5.5), can be powdered
Radioisotope thermoelectric generator 
(1000-10.000 TBq)
137Cs Salt (CsCl) (can be dissolved -
liquid)
Sterilisation irradiator (up to 400,000 
TBq).  Teletherapy source (up to 1000 
TBq)
192Ir Metal – soft - Mohs hardness 
6.5 (can be powdered), 
insoluble in water
Industrial radiography source (up to 50 
TBq)
226Ra Salt (RaSO4) (can be 
powdered), very low solubility
Old therapy source (up to 5 TBq)
238Pu Ceramic (PuO2) - insoluble, can 
be powdered
Radioisotope thermoelectric generator 
(up to 5,000 TBq)
241Am Pressed ceramic powder 
(AmO2)
Well logging source (up to 1 TBq).
252Cf Ceramic (Cf2O3) - insoluble Well logging source (up to 0.1 TBq).
(see, e.g., Harper et al., 2007;  Ferguson et al., 2003; Argonne, 2005) 
Suitability for aerosolisation and dispersion
Powders: Depends on, e.g., original powder size and porosity
Phase transition possible at high pressure
Typically 20-80 % aerosolised
Ceramics: Typically 2-40 % aerosolised
Debris of 60Co after high explosion
Metals: Very little cobalt (<0.2 %)
aerosolised
Liquids: Formation of (slightly)
submicroneous particles
after evaporation, 
depending on construction.
Almost full aerosolisation
is possible.
Harper et al. (Sandia Natl. Lab.), 2007
Initial salt grains
(large)
Shock sublimation
of salts (< 1 µm)
Shock melting of
salts (< 10 µm)
Aerosol size distribution – In nebulisation
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Natural and forced removal from ’urban’ surfaces
Chernobyl-
experience
for roofs
Clark and Cobbin (1964) recorded a DF of 50 when hosing a street
contaminated by 44-100 µm particles. 
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Spraying of inert water solutions on similar limestone walls removed 
two-thirds of the caesium contamination in Pripyat, but only about one-fifth 
of the caesium contamination in Vladimirovka (Roed & Andersson, 1996). 
IAEA studies modelling concluded that standard weathering parameters
were inapplicable to describe contaminant migration in the Pripyat area 
(model output far from measured contamination/ dose rate).
Different particle characteristics lead to different post-deposition behaviour.
Migration in soil of low-solubility contaminants
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Time-dependence of the fraction of 90Sr dissolved from fuel particles in the 
areas contaminated by the Chernobyl accident, according to an empirical 
model. Model curves are shown for different soil pH values.
Implications and conclusions
Targeted techniques for examination of fixation of ’untraditional’ contaminants
in soil and other materials in inhabited areas are needed (e.g., targeted
sequential extraction procedures).
Contaminant could be a single pure alpha or beta emitter, which would set new
requirements to laboratories’ measurement techniques.  Rapid analysis is here
a key issue.
Estimation of environmental behaviour of different contaminants on different
physicochemical forms is needed PRIOR to an emergency, to allow
parameterisation of DSS to facilitate reliable consequence prognoses for
justification and optimisation of intervention.
Investigations (e.g., solubility, leachability, morphology, surface composition, 
size) of bomb-produced particles of radionuclide surrogates can give important
information, allowing contaminant classification with respect to environmental
migration.
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